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Abstract
This paper explores how tax reforms with taxes on unhealthy commodities impact
consumer behaviours and welfare when individual health is endogenised. We employ
a dynamic general equilibrium model which includes both goods and health sectors.
Although unhealthy commodities provide utility, they pose a detrimental effect on
health. The analytical results show that the introduction of taxes on unhealthy com-
modities does not have direct effects on health in the steady state. However, based on
our simulation results, with a revenue-neutral tax reform where labour income taxes
are adjusted, the introduction of taxes on unhealthy commodities improves both health
and welfare, but reduces leisure in the long run. On the other hand, a tax reform where
capital income taxes are adjusted contributes to even higher welfare as both health
and leisure improve. Our analysis may inform policy making decisions on taxation of
unhealthy commodities when government can adjust pre-existing taxes.
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1 Introduction
The rising global burden of non-communicable diseases such as diabetes, cardiovascu-
lar and coronary heart diseases, and certain types of cancer has driven policy makers to
explore approaches to improve population health (Lim et al., 2013). Since many major
health problems are due to individual behaviours such as over-consumption of foods and
beverages high in fat, sugar and salt content, it is possible to use fiscal policy to target these
unhealthy commodities (e.g. Lustig et al., 2012; Chokshi and Farley, 2014). Changing the
relative prices of these commodities via taxation is one of the policies which has been
proposed and explored the most in the public arena. Examples include the public health
product tax in Hungary, several taxes on saturated fat in Denmark, and the recently passed
Soft Drink Industry Levy (also known as the “sugar tax”) in the UK.
Taxes on unhealthy commodities should discourage consumption and thus contribute
to higher level of population health. However, existing studies do not always support
this intuition. Fletcher et al. (2010) find that soft drink taxes in the US induce significant
changes in consumer behaviours, but the impacts on body mass index (BMI) are generally
small in magnitude. In addition to the negligible impacts on health, Mytton et al. (2007)
even show that the introduction of taxes on saturated fat in the UK could increase mortality
due to cardiovascular diseases, because the households would increase their intake of
salt. Schroeter et al. (2008) warn that people could consume other, untaxed, unhealthy
commodities in response, and thus increase their BMI. Yaniv et al. (2009) explain that,
even if a fat tax reduce the consumption of junk foods, obesity could still arise because the
individual might spend less time exercising.
One interesting finding in the literature is that, when coupled with other fiscal instru-
ments such as subsidies, taxes on unhealthy commodities are more likely to be beneficial
to health (e.g. Nnoaham et al., 2009; Tiffin and Arnoult, 2011; Cornelsen and Carreido,
2015). Therefore, the government should consider more comprehensive policies to ensure
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the positive impact on health.
One mechanism which may help explain the results is the role of health investment as
in Grossman (1972) and Goulao and Pe´rez-Barahona (2014). Health investment, such as
exercise and health care, could improve the level of health both in short and long run (e.g.
Lucas et al., 2003; Nemet et al., 2005; Oja et al., 2016). This mechanism endogenises health
by connecting it with certain individual behaviours. If taxes on unhealthy commodities
induce the individual to invest less on health, they could fail to improve the individual’s
level of health. In the canonical model of Grossman (1972), health is considered as a
capital stock which increases with investment. The individual invests in health not only
because it provides utility, but also because it produces more “healthy time” which is
available for work. Goulao and Pe´rez-Barahona (2014) include the detrimental effect
of unhealthy commodities into the health function of Grossman (1972), so that one can
clearly identify the impacts on consumption. The result of their paper shows that taxes on
unhealthy commodities, when coupled with subsidies on health investment, can restore
the optimal level of health when the individuals are myopic.1
The mechanism of health investment is also used in this paper to explore how reforms
with taxes on unhealthy commodities may influence individual behaviours in relation to
health. We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model with two sectors: the goods
sector, which produces consumption commodities, and the health sector, which provides
the individual with health. In our model, the concept of health is in line with Grossman
(1972) in that health provides both utility and income benefits, so that we can clearly
examine how the individual level of health is determined. This endogenous health decision
is important in our paper because unhealthy commodities taxes are usually employed to
target health problems which are due to consumption choices (such as lifestyle choices).
Different from Goulao and Pe´rez-Barahona (2014), we endogenise individual income by
addressing both labour supply and capital in the economy. By doing so, we are able to
1O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006) and Cremer et al. (2012) also study the role of taxes on unhealthy
commodities in the economy, but they do not specify the equations to illustrate the law of motion of health.
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highlight the roles of different fiscal instruments (taxes on labour income, capital income,
and consumption), and thus the efficacy of the tax reforms. One novelty of our model is
found in how it embeds individual preference for health in that of leisure. To be more
specific, the individual can allocate healthy time either into leisure for higher utility
or into labour supply for higher income. This novelty helps us to clarify the trade-off
between leisure and labour supply when it comes to the changes in taxes on labour income.
Unhealthy commodities, which also provide individual with utility, pose a detrimental
effect on the accumulation of health. The individual has to find the balance between
the utility and the detrimental effect from these commodities. In addition to the utility
function, we also specify the production function of health with labour supply and capital.
This specification allows us to carefully examine the changes in individual investment
decision between the two sectors in response to the taxes. The results indicate that the
implementation of taxes on unhealthy commodities does not improve the level of health
directly in the steady state. Nevertheless, with revenue-neutral tax reforms which raise
taxes on unhealthy commodities but lower those on income, the implementation can
improve the steady state level of health and that of welfare.
The paper proceeds as follows. A two-sector model with endogenous health is intro-
duced in Section 2. First of all, the model will be presented in a centralised economy in
order to provide a more general and clearer view of the system. Individual utility and the
resource constraints for the goods sector and the health sector will be carefully examined.
The model will then be applied in a decentralised economy in Section 2.1, and the taxes
on unhealthy commodities, numeraire commodities, capital income, and labour income
will be introduced into the model. The optimisation conditions for the problem will be
discussed in Section 2.2. Following those conditions, Section 2.3 will explore the steady
state solutions. In Section 3, a tax analysis will be performed based on the steady state
solutions solved in the previous sections. We will perform policy analysis in Section 4.
Due to the complicated relationships between the variables, we calibrate the model on
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the US economy in Section 4.1 to avoid ambiguous effects of the taxes. In Section 4.3, we
will employ the calibrated parameters to analyse the impacts of two revenue-neutral tax
reforms: the reform which levies unhealthy commodities taxes whilst adjusting labour
income taxes and the reform which levies unhealthy commodities taxes whilst adjusting
capital income taxes. Finally, conclusions will be offered in Section 5.
2 The Model
This section presents the model for the analysis. In the model, the individual can freely
allocate healthy time into leisure or labour supply. Healthy time can be attained through
the accumulation of health, h, with decreasing marginal returns (Grossman, 1972). The
individual determines l fraction of healthy time spent on labour supply and leaves (1− l)
for leisure. Along with leisure, the numeraire goods, c, and unhealthy commodities, x,
also bring the individual with utility. The individual lifetime utility is as follows:
U =
∫ ∞
0
u(c,x,L)e−ρtdt, (1)
where L ≡ (1− l)hµ is leisure, hµ is healthy time, and ρ is the rate of time preference.
The economy is constituted by the goods sector y and the health sector m, and both
sectors require the same inputs of capital and labour supply following the setups of Bond
et al. (1996) and Azariadis et al. (2013).
y = f (sk,vlhµ), (2)
m =m((1− s)k, (1− v)lhµ), (3)
where s and v are the fractions of capital and labour supply devoted into the goods sector.
The prices of the two goods are standardised into unity for simplicity. The law of
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motion in the capital thus is set as follows:
k˙ = y − c − x, (4)
where the variables with a dot on the top hereafter represents the growth of that variable.
x enters the law of motion of h because it poses detrimental effects on health. In
consistent with Goulao and Pe´rez-Barahona (2014), the natural depreciation of health, δ,
is not affected by the consumption of x:
h˙ =m− ηx − δh, (5)
where η ≥ 0 and δ ≥ 0. In this expression, η is the measure of the detrimental effects of
unhealthy commodities on health. The extreme case of η = 0 refers to the situation where
unhealthy commodities pose negligible effects on health.
2.1 The Decentralised Economy
In a decentralised economy, the firms in both sectors seek to maximise their own profits.
The firm in the goods sector sells its production y and pays the rental prices of ry and wy
for the capital and labour supply that it uses.
max. y − rysk −wyvlhµ, (6)
where
ry = f1, (7a)
wy = f2. (7b)
5
In this expression, f1 and f2 are the marginal product of capital and that of labour supply.
In the health sector, the producer sells m with the price of pm, and pays the rental prices
of rm and wm for the capital and labour supply used in production. The optimisation
problem can be written as:
max.pmm− rm(1− s)k −wm(1− v)lhµ, (8)
where
rm = pmm1, (9a)
wm = pmm2. (9b)
m1 and m2 are the marginal product of capital and that of labour supply in the health
sector.
At every point of time, the government receives tax revenue from taxes on capital
income, labour income, and commodities. Assuming the government balances its budget
by financing a lump-sum transfer, G, to the individual:
G = τk(sry + (1− s)rm)k + τl(vwy + (1− v)wm)lhµ + τcc+ τxx, (10)
where τk , τl , τc, and τx are the taxes on capital income, labour income, numeraire goods,
and unhealthy commodities.
One can view pmm and the taxes paid in the health sector as forgone opportunities to
accumulate more capital. Therefore, equation (4) can then be transformed into:
k˙ = (1−τk)(rysk+rm(1−s)k)+(1−τl)(wyvlhµ+wm(1−v)lhµ)−(1+τc)c−(1+τx)x−pmm+G. (11)
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2.2 The Optimisation Problem
Maximising the utility (1) under the constraints of (5) and (11), we form the Hamilto-
nian function as follows:
H =u(c,x,L) +λ[(1− τk)(rysk + rm(1− s)k) + (1− τl)(wyvlhµ +wm(1− v)lhµ)
− (1 + τc)c − (1 + τx)x − pmm+G] + q[m− ηx − δh],
where λ is the shadow price of capital, and q is the shadow price of health. The first-order
conditions for this optimisation problem are:
uc = λ(1 + τc), (12a)
ux = λ(1 + τx) + qη, (12b)
uLh
µ = λ(1− τl)(wyvhµ +wm(1− v)hµ), (12c)
ry = rm, (12d)
wy = wm, (12e)
λpm = q, (12f)
λ(1− τk)(rys+ rm(1− s)) = λρ − λ˙, (12g)
µuL(1− l)hµ−1 +λµ(1− τl)(wyvlhµ−1 +wm(1− v)lhµ−1)− qδ = qρ − q˙, (12h)
along with the transversality conditions,
lim
t→∞e
−ρtλ(t)k(t) = 0, (12i)
lim
t→∞e
−ρtq(t)h(t) = 0. (12j)
(12a) equates the optimal consumption of numeraire goods to the product of shadow price
of k and (1 + τc); (12b) shows that the optimal consumption of unhealthy commodities
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partly depends on both the shadow price of k and that of h; (12c) equates the marginal
utility of leisure to the marginal costs of labour supply in both sectors; (12d) and (12e)
describe the optimal allocation of inputs between the two sectors; (12f) implies that
the relative value of the two shadow prices depends on pm; (12g) and (12h) are the Euler
equations; and (12i) and (12j) are the conditions to exclude any Ponzi game in the economy.
With (12d), we can reform the evolution of λ from (12g) as:
λ˙
λ
= ρ − (1− τk)r, (13)
where r ≡ ry = rm. With (12c), (12e), and (12f), the evolution of q in (12h) can be written
as:
q˙
q
= ρ+ δ − µ
pm
(1− τl)whµ−1, (14)
where w ≡ wy = wm.
2.3 The Equilibrium
In this subsection, the steady state solutions will be explored by using the first-order
conditions presented in Section 2.2. As shown in (13), r is pinned down by ρ and τk in
the steady state. If the production technology in the goods sector is constant returns to
scale, vlhµsk and
ry
wm
are fixed in the steady state. Accordingly, referring to equations (12d)
and (12e), m1m2 and thus pm are also pinned down in the steady state.
With (7a), (7b), (12g), and (12h), we can then attain the steady state level of h as
follows:
h∗ =
( f2µ(1− τl)ρ
f1pm(ρ+ δ)(1− τk)
) 1
1−µ
. (15)
Given a constant labour to capital ratio in either sector, the level of h converges to an
optimum in the long run as shown in (15). The somewhat counter-intuitive fact that τx
does not appear in the equation implies the following proposition:
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Proposition 1. With a constant labour to capital ratio, taxes on unhealthy commodities do
not affect the level of health in equilibrium.
The main reason is that m has to decrease in response to the decrease in x, so that the
steady state condition for (5) can be held. The story behind this logic is that the individual
finds it beneficial to decrease the investment in health, m, when the detrimental effects on
h diminishes. Therefore, reduced health investment offsets the beneficial effect of reducing
of x, leaving h∗ unchanged. However, (15) only implies that the implementation of τx
would have no direct impacts on the level of health. It is possible that τx can still affect
the level of health through indirect channels with more complete tax reforms. Detailed
information of the tax reform will be provided in Section 4.3.
Equations (15) is derived from general functions. To provide a clearer view of the
following analysis, we adopt specific functions for (1)-(3). The utility function (1) is set to
be the following form:
u(c,x,L) = lnc+θ lnx+ψ ln((1− l)hµ), (16)
where θ is the preference to unhealthy commodities, x, and ψ is the preference to leisure.
The production functions follow the Cobb-Douglas forms:
y = A(sk)α(vlhµ)(1−α), (17)
m = B((1− s)k)β((1− v)lhµ)(1−β), (18)
where α and β are the shares of capital and A and B are the production efficiency factors
in the two sectors.
With the specified production functions, we are able to clarify the relationship between
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s and v by using (12d) and (12e):
v =
β(1−α)s
α(1− β)− (α − β)s , (19)
which implies that v is increasing in swhen α ≥ β. This condition is also shown in Azariadis
et al. (2013). If the capital and labour supply are complements, then the allocation of
capital in one sector should be positively related to that of labour supply. Note that, when
α = β, v = s, meaning that the individual invests in the goods sector with identical fractions
of both inputs.
Considering the evolution of λ will stop in the steady state, we derive the following
condition from (7a), (13), and (17):
lhµ
k
=
s
v
( ρ
αA(1− τk)
) 1
1−α
. (20)
The left-hand side of the equation is the labour to capital ratio in the economy. Equation
(20) shows that this ratio is partly determined by the ratio of s to v. In addition to λ˙ = 0, q˙
should also be zero in the steady state. Therefore, with (7b), (14), and (18), we derive that:
lhµ
k
=
s
v
(µA(1− τl)(1−α)
pm(δ+ ρ)
) 1
α
h
−(1−µ)
α . (21)
With (20) and (21), we can characterise h∗ as:
h∗ =
(αA(1− τk)
ρ
) α
(1−α)(1−µ) (µA(1− τl)(1−α)
pm(δ+ ρ)
) 1
1−µ
. (22)
We can also attain a specified function for pm with (9a), (13), and (20),:
pm =
α
α(1−β)
1−α
ββ
(1−α
1− β
)1−β(A 1−β1−α
B
)(1− τk
ρ
)α−β
1−α
. (23)
This equation implies that the relative price of m is affected by the ratio of the production
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efficiency factors in both sectors. Given the inputs in both sector, a higher A contributes a
more efficient production in the goods sector compared to that in the health sector, and
thus decrease the relative prices of the products in the goods sector. Therefore, pm increases
as A increases. On the other hand, if the production in the health sector is more efficient
than the production in the goods sector, relative prices of the products in the goods sector
are expected to be higher. Therefore, pm decreases as B raises the relative productivity
in the health sector. Equation (23) also implies a negative relationship between τk and
pm. The reason behind this negative relationship is that larger taxes on capital income
reduce the after-tax marginal product of capital (as in (12g)) and thus decrease the relative
shadow price of q to λ. Based on the positive relationship between pm and the ratio of q to
λ shown in (12f), an increase in τk thus decreases pm in the long run.
The steady state of k can be obtained by using (20) and (22):
k∗ = v
∗
s∗
(αA(1− τk)
ρ
) 1
1−α
l∗(h∗)µ, (24)
where k∗ has to increase as the labour supply increases, l∗(h∗)µ, so that the labour to capital
ratio is fixed in equilibrium.
We then derive x as a function of c by rewriting (12b) with the specification in (16).
x∗ = θ(1 + τc)
1 + τx + pmη
c∗. (25)
This equation shows that the consumption choice of x over c is positively affected by τc
and the measure of the individual preference to unhealthy commodities, θ. Given c∗,
equation (25) also indicates that ∂x∗∂τx < 0,
∂x∗
∂η < 0, and
∂x∗
∂pm
< 0. In accordance to the prevailing
hypothesis of the supporters of taxes on unhealthy commodities, τx deters the consumption
of unhealthy commodities because it raises the relative prices of unhealthy commodities.
To understand the negative effects of η: η is the marginal detrimental effect of consuming
one unit of x (as in (5)). Therefore, given all other parameters, an increase in η would
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make the individual less willing to consume x∗ due to the increased marginal costs. In
terms of the negative relationship between x∗ and pm, an increase in pm indicates that the
individual has to pay more to compensate for the loss in health. Therefore, given all other
parameters, the individual would reduce x∗ in response to the increase in pm.
Next, we rewrite (12c) into:
c∗ =
pm(ρ+ δ)
µψ(1 + τc)
(1− l∗)h∗. (26)
In addition to the evolutions of λ and q, the evolution h should also be zero in the steady
state. Therefore, we force h˙ = 0 in (5) and obtain that:
m = ηx+ δh. (27)
With (18) and (21), and (25), equation (27) can be written as:
ρ+ δ
µ(1− β)(1− τl)(1− v)lh =
ηθ(1 + τc)
1 + τx + pmη
c+ δh. (28)
With (20) and (25), the market clearing condition in the goods sector, y = x + c, can be
reformed into:
pm(ρ+ δ)vlh
µ(1− τl)(1−α) =
(pi+θ(1 + τc))c
pi
. (29)
Equations (22), (26), (28), and (29) form a system which could be used to solve for the
steady state of c, l, and v:
c∗ = ω(1− τl)(1− l
∗)h∗
ψ(1 + τc)
, (30)
l∗ =
pm(1− β)(δpih∗ + ηθ(1 + τc)c∗)
ω(1− v∗)pih∗ , (31)
v∗ = (1−α)(pi+θ(1 + τc))c
∗
piωl∗h∗ , (32)
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where ω ≡ pm(ρ+δ)µ(1−τl ) and pi ≡ 1 + τx + pmη. With (19), one can also attain a function for s
∗:
s∗ = α(1− β)(pi+θ(1 + τc))c
∗
(α − β)(pi+θ(1 + τc))c∗ + βpiωl∗h∗ (33)
3 Tax Analysis
This section conducts a comparative static analysis to examine the long-run impacts
of taxes on unhealthy commodities. To investigate the impacts of τx on the variables, we
perform comparative static analysis based on the steady state solutions. Referring to (30),
τx affects c∗ through the following channel:
dc∗
dτx
=
∂c∗
∂l∗
dl∗
dτx
> 0. (34)
Since ∂c∗∂l∗ =
−c∗
1−l∗ < 0, the positive derivative of (30) with respect to τx implies that
dl∗
dτx
< 0. The
above derivation shows that changes in τx do not affect c∗ directly; instead, they affect c∗
via their impacts on l∗. The decrease in l∗ implied by (34) would result in two opposing
effects on c∗: first, it increases leisure, so the individual has to increase c∗ to maintain the
marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between c∗ and leisure; second, it decreases labour
supply, so the individual has to decrease c∗ to hold k˙ = 0 in the steady state. In our model,
the first effect dominates the second effect, so the overall effect of τx on c∗ is positive.
As stated in (19), s and v move in the same direction as long as α ≥ β. If the parameters
comply with this condition, the changes in s∗ would automatically imply the changes in v∗.
For succinctness, the following analysis will just focus on the transitions in s∗. As shown
in (33), the changes in τx affect s∗ both directly and indirectly:
ds∗
dτx
=
∂s∗
∂c∗
dc∗
dτx
+
∂s∗
dl∗
dl∗
∂τx
+
∂s∗
∂τx
R 0. (35)
In the above expression, ∂s∗∂c∗ =
βpiωl∗h∗s∗
((α−β)(pi+θ(1+τc))c+βpiωl∗h∗)c > 0,
∂s∗
∂l∗ =
−βpiωhs∗
(α−β)(pi+θ(1+τc))c+βpiωl∗h∗ < 0,
∂s∗
∂τx
=
13
−βθω(1+τc)l∗h∗s∗
(pi+θ(1+τc))((α−β)(pi+θ(1+τc))c+βpiωl∗h∗) < 0. An increase in c
∗ induced by τx would force s∗ to increase
so that the goods market clearing condition can be satisfied. In response to the negative
impact of τx on l∗ (which is implied in (34)), the individual has to increase s∗ to hold the
MRS between consumption and leisure constant. The illustration for the negative direct
effect of τx on s is that, as shown in the resource constraint of (11), larger τx reduce the
accumulation of k because they crowd out the resources available. It should be noted that
the direct and indirect effects of τx on s∗ are opposite to each other, and we are not able to
determine which effect dominate the others. Specific parameters are required to solve this
complex interrelationship. With this issue in mind, the calibration and a more specific
analysis will be presented in Section 4.1.
Referring to (31), the negative relationship between τx and l∗ can be disentangled into
the following form:
dl∗
dτx
=
∂l∗
∂c∗
dc∗
dτx
+
∂l∗
∂v∗
dv∗
ds∗
ds∗
dτx
+
∂l∗
∂τx
< 0, (36)
where ∂l∗∂c∗ =
ηθ(1+τx)l∗
ηθ(1+τc)c∗+δpih∗ > 0,
∂l∗
∂v∗ =
l∗
1−v∗ > 0 and
∂l∗
∂τx
= −ηθ(1+τc)c
∗l∗
pi(δpih∗+ηθ(1+τc)c∗) < 0. As shown in (34), larger
τx increase c∗. This positive impact on c∗ translates into two opposing effects on l∗: first, l∗
has to increase to hold the goods market clearance condition; second, l∗ has to decrease to
restore the MRS between consumption and leisure. However, the first effect dominates the
second one, so the indirect effect of τx through c∗ is positive on l∗. Due to the ambiguous
effect of τx on s∗, we cannot determine whether the indirect effect is positive or negative.
On the other hand, the direct effect of τx on x∗ is negative in that an increase in τx would
violate the steady state condition for (11). Therefore, the individual has to decrease the
input in the production function y. Although the indirect effect is ambiguous in the
general case, the overall effect of implementing τx is negative to l∗.
The changes in τx would change x∗:
dx∗
dτx
=
∂x∗
∂c∗
dc∗
dτx
+
∂x∗
∂τx
< 0, (37)
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where ∂x∗∂c∗ =
x∗
c∗ > 0 and
∂x∗
∂τx
= −x∗pi < 0. The expression above shows that, in addition to the
direct channel, τx can also impact x∗ through the indirect channel of c∗. The illustration
for ∂x
∗
∂c∗ > 0 is that the individual has to consume more x with increased c due to larger τx,
so that the MRS between x and c remains constant (as in (12b)). Referring to the positive
relationship between c∗ and τx discussed in (34), the indirect effect of τx is positive on
x∗. The illustration of the direct effect is straightforward: higher prices on x deter the
consumption of x. Based on the full derivative, the direct effect of τx on x∗ outweighs the
indirect effect. This negative relationship between x∗ and τx is in line with the proposition
of most of the supporters for taxes on unhealthy commodities.
Intuitively, since τx reduces x∗, larger τx should be beneficial to h∗. However, as shown
in (22), it is surprising that τx plays no role in h∗. As explained in Section 2.3, although τx
reduces the consumption of x, the individual has to reduce the investment in the health
sector in order to hold the optimality condition in (5). The decreased investment in the
health sector offsets the positive force from the reduced x∗. On the other hand, h∗ can be
affected by the implementations of τl and τk:
dh∗
dτl
=
∂h∗
∂τl
< 0, (38)
dh∗
dτk
=
∂h∗
∂τk
+
∂h∗
∂pm
∂pm
∂τk
< 0, (39)
where ∂h∗∂τl =
−h∗
(1−µ)(1−τl ) < 0,
∂h∗
∂τk
= −αh∗(1−α)(1−µ)(1−τk ) < 0, and
∂h∗
∂pm
= −h∗(1−µ)pm < 0. It is worth noting that
the direct effects of income taxes on health are both negative. The reason is that the
implementation of either taxes would immediately crowd out the resources available for
the health sector. In addition to the direct effect, changes in τk also affect h∗ through the
channel of pm. h∗ is negative in pm because higher prices on health services deter the
investment in the health sector. Considering the negative relationship between pm and
τk, this indirect effect is thus positive. Nevertheless, the direct effect of τk outweighs the
indirect effect, so the relationship between h∗ and τk is still negative.
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4 Policy Analysis
Due to the complexity of the comparative-static effects, the analysis of the tax reform
requires specific parameters for unambiguous variations in the variables. We first apply
the model to the US economy, and then simulate the changes of the economy with two
proposed reforms under the revenue-neutral scheme: the reform which adjusts τl to offset
the change in revenue induced by τx, and the reform which adjusts τk to offset the changes
in revenue induced by τx.
4.1 Calibration
Although we calibrate the model on the US economy, we have to employ the Canadian
data for the natural depreciation of health, δ. Considering the similarity in their natural
force of health depreciation, the data of Canadian population can be a good approximation
for the US population (e.g. Rockwood and Mitnitski, 2007; Dalgaard and Strulik, 2014;
Strulik, 2015). The value δ is selected as 0.043 based on the estimation of Mitnitski et al.
(2002).
Referring McDaniel (2007), the average tax rates on labour income, capital income, and
commodities in the US from 1970-2013 are around 0.20, 0.28, 0.08 respectively. Therefore,
the initial tax rates are set to be τl = 0.20, τk = 0.28 and τc = τx = 0.08. The rate of time
preference, ρ, is selected to be 0.04 following Azariadis et al. (2013). The share of capital
in the goods sector, α, is set to be 0.3 as in Chen and Lu (2013). We employ the data of
β = 0.22 in the health industry documented by Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008). It is worth
noting that, as implied by (19), the observation of α = 0.3 and β = 0.22 entails v′(s) ≥ 0.
Prescott (2006) pointed out that the fraction of time allocated to labour market in the
US is around 25 percent, so we choose l∗ to be 0.25 in this paper. The initial output in
the goods sector, y, is normalised to 1, so that all the other economic variables can be
easily presented as a fraction of y. Data retrieved from the Consumer Survey conducted by
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Bureau of Labor Statistics shows that the expenditure on food-away-from-home 2013-2015
is around 4% as a ratio of total household expenditure.2 As shown in (11), the GDP in this
model is y + pmm, so the consumption of unhealthy commodities as a ratio of GDP is then
calibrated in the following form:
x∗
y + pmm
= 0.04.
The OECD statistics shows that the ratio of health expenditure to GDP in the US between
1970 and 2013 is around 12%. This information can be employed into the calibration in
the form of:
pmm
y + pmm
= 0.12.
With the normalisation of y, the ratio of pmm to y is 0.1364. This value then implies
that the fraction x∗ to y should be 0.0455. With the goods market clearing condition, the
fraction of c∗ to y is then be calibrated as 0.9545. Equations (12d) and (12e) imply that,
with the specified parameters, s and v can be calibrated as 0.9091 and 0.8681 respectively.
By using (7b), (9b), and (12e), we rewrite (12c) in the form of:
ψ =
(1− τl)(1− l∗)
(1 + τc)l∗
( y
c∗
)
((1−α) + (1− β)pmm
y
). (40)
Inserting the specified parameters into the above equation, we then calibrate that ψ =
1.8772. With (12g), (7a), (9a), and (12d), the ratio of k to y can then be calibrated as 5.9400.
The determination of pm is relatively flexible, because a different pm could be the result
of health services being calculated in different units. In this paper, we select pm to be 1 for
simplicity. This selection further entails λ = q as in (12f). With (12c) and (12h), the value
of h∗ can be presented as:
h∗ =
µψ(1 + τc)c∗
(1− l∗)(ρ+ δ) , (41)
2The survey items partly changed in 2013, so we only include the data 2013-2015 to maintain the
consistency.
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which indicates that the value of h in this calibration is affected by the value of µ.
In the steady state, h˙ = 0. By using (41), we rewrite (5) into:
η =
y
x∗
(m
y
− µψ(1 + τc)c
∗
(1− l∗)(ρ+ δ)y
)
, (42)
indicating that the determination of µ affects the value of η. For η to be non-negative, the
term inside the bracket of equation (42) has to be greater or equal to zero. Therefore,
µ ≤ (1− l
∗)(ρ+ δ)m
δψ(1 + τc)c∗
, (43)
where the expression on the right-hand side of the equation is the upper limit of µ, µ¯. With
the specific parameters presented in this paper, µ¯ = 0.1020. This paper chooses µ = 0.09 as
the benchmark. With the benchmark µ, η is then 0.0632, and the ratio of h to y is 2.7980.
θ can thus be calibrated as 0.0347 from (12b). By using (2) and (3), we then calculate that
A = 1.6466 and B = 2.0797. In addition to the benchmark parameter set, we also include
the other two parameter sets:
Table 1: Calibrated parametes
Parameters Parameter set 1 (benchmark) Parameter set 2 Parameter set 3
µ 0.09 0.102 0.04
θ 0.0632 0.0476 0.128
η 0.3531 0 1.8236
A 1.6466 1.6178 1.7461
B 2.0797 2.0394 2.2203
It should be noted that the parameter set 2 is the extreme case where unhealthy commodi-
ties do not post any detrimental effect on health (µ = µ¯). In addition, we choose parameter
set 3 to consider the case where the detrimental effect of unhealthy commodities is higher.
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4.2 Comparative-Static Analysis of Changing τx Alone
We present the simulation results in Figure 1 to provide a clearer view of the effects of
implementing τx alone.
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Figure 1: Comparative-static effects of τx
This figure shows the comparative-static effects of τx in the steady state with three
parameter sets listed in Table 1: (1) The solid curves denote the case with benchmark
parameter; (2) the dashed curves denote the case with parameter set 2; (3) the dash-dotted
curves denote the case with parameter set 3. It is clear that the effects of τx on s∗ are
somewhat different across scenarios: s∗ slightly decreases as τx increases when µ = µ¯,
whilst it increases when µ < µ¯. In the case of µ = µ¯, unhealthy commodities act similarly
to numeriare goods in that they both provide the individual with utilities but not posing
negative impacts on health. Consequently, the individual would not have the incentive to
adjust the amount of investment in health in response to the changes in x∗. Considering the
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decreases in both labour supply and capital, the individual has to move the investments
away from the goods sector to restore the production in the health sector. The effects of τx
on m are plotted in Figure 2:
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Figure 2: The effects of τx on m
Figure 2 clearly shows that in the case of µ = µ¯, health investment is basically fixed
regardless of the changes in τx. However, when µ ≤ µ¯, the individual decreases the overall
m in response to the increases in τx.
To simplify the discussion, this paper will focus more on the benchmark scenario. The
results of the comparative static analysis are listed in the Table 2.
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Table 2: Changes in tax rates with government revenue being inconsistent
τl τk τx
c∗ − − +
x∗ − − −
l∗ − − −
s∗ + + +
k∗ − − −
h∗ − − 0
The simulation for the comparative-static effects of the income taxes can be found in
Appendix B. It should be noted that the variations listed in Table 2 are in the context of
government revenue being inconsistent. In the next subsection, we will introduce tax
reforms with revenue neutrality.
4.3 Tax Reform
The derivation of this subsection starts from the simplification of the government
budget (10).
F ≡ τkrk + τlwlhµ + τxx −G = 0. (44)
With the calibration discussed in Section 4.1, it is clear that dFdτk > 0,
dF
dτl
> 0, dFdτx > 0,
dF
dτc
> 0.
Employing the implicit function theorem, the balanced government budget leads to:
dτk
dτx
= −dF/dτx
dF/dτk
< 0, and
dτl
dτx
= −dF/dτx
dF/dτl
< 0.
These negative relationships confirm that the government can keep revenue constant
by raising τx whilst deducing τl or τk. Therefore, we propose two potential tax reforms:
first, raising τx whilst reducing τl ; second, raising τx whilst reducing τk. To calculate
appropriate income tax rates, we endogenise τl and τk in this subsection an plot the
income tax rates in response to the changes in τx in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: The replacement of τl and that of τk with τx under revenue-neutral schemes
In Figure 3, the solid curve indicates the changes in the average rate of labour income tax
in response to the increases in τx with revenue neutrality, and the dashed curve represents
those in the average rate of capital income tax in response to the increases in τx with
revenue neutrality. In the following analysis, the model is applied to the simulation by
changing τx from 0% to 100% to examine the long run effects of the tax reforms.3
3For the concision of the paper, the analysis here only includes the benchmark scenario. The changes in
other scenarios are presented in Appendix C
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Figure 4: Tax reform of replacing τl with τx
The variations of the variables at the steady state due to the replacement of τk with τx is
presented in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Tax reform of replacing τk with τx
The effects of the tax reforms of replacing τl or τk with τx on c∗ can be separated into
23
two parts:
dc∗
dτx
=
∂c∗
∂τx
+
∂c∗
∂τi
dτi
dτx
, where i = l,k. (45)
As shown in Table 2, it is known that ∂c∗∂τx > 0,
∂c∗
∂τl
< 0, and ∂c∗∂τk < 0. Based on the analysis in
Section 3, larger τx contribute to a higher c∗ through the channel of l∗. In addition to this
effect, increases in τx would also affect c∗ through the channel of decreasing τl or that of
τk with the reforms. To illustrate the channel of decreasing τl : a decrease in τl raises the
marginal cost of leisure (as shown in (12c)). This effect would encourage the individual to
provide more labour supply, resulting in two opposing effects. First, it contributes to a
higher output in the goods sector. To clear the goods market, the consumption of c∗ (and
also x∗) has to increase in the long run. Second, it decreases leisure, so that the individual
has to increase c∗ to hold the MRS constant. As shown in Figure 4, the negative effect is
overshadowed by the positive effects, resulting in a case where c∗ is always increasing in
τx. The channel of decreasing τk can be examined from (12g): a decrease in τk raises the
after-tax marginal product of capital, so an increase in k∗ is needed to reduce the pre-tax
marginal product of capital. As a result, c∗ has to increase so that the steady state condition
for the resource constraint can be held.
Figures 4 and 5 show that x∗ decreases in τx in both reforms. The reason behind these
relations can be seen from equation (25):
dx∗
dτx
=
∂x∗
∂τx
+
∂x∗
∂τi
dτi
dτx
, (46)
where ∂x∗∂τx < 0,
∂x∗
∂τl
< 0, and ∂x∗∂τk < 0. The full derivative shows that the negative relationship
between τx and x∗ is composed of two opposite effects: the negative effect of τx and the
positive effect through the channel of decreasing τl or τk. The negative effect of τx can be
examined from (37). To understand the positive effects through the channels of decreasing
income taxes, we note that any changes in τl or τk which affects c∗ would require the
adjustment in x∗ so as to restore the MRS. Therefore, an increase in c∗ induced by smaller
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τl would prompt the individual to raise x∗; likewise, an increase in c∗ due to smaller τk
would also make the individual increase x∗. However, with the calibration in Section 4.1,
the positive effect always dominates the negative effects through income taxes in both
reforms.
To explain the difference between the impacts of the reforms on l∗, we first take the
full derivatives of l∗ with respect to τx:
dl∗
dτx
=
∂l∗
∂τx
+
∂l∗
∂τi
dτi
dτx
, (47)
where ∂l∗∂τx < 0,
∂l∗
∂τl
< 0, and ∂l∗∂τk < 0. The introduction of τx affects l
∗ through two opposite
effects: the negative effect of τx on l∗ and the positive effects through the decreases in
income taxes. The negative effect of τx on l∗ has been discussed in Section 3. To understand
the positive effect through τl : a decrease in τl raises the marginal cost of leisure (as in (12c)),
so the individual would find it optimal to reduce leisure in the steady state by increasing l∗.
The simulation result shows that, in the reform of replacing τl , the positive effect through
decreasing τl dominates the negative effect of τx on l∗, so l∗ increases with τx, resulting
in more labour supply in the economy. The impact of τk on l∗ can be separated into two
effects. The first effect can be examined from (12c) and (12g): smaller τk encourage the
accumulation of k∗ and thus increases the level of c∗. The individual has to decrease l∗ to
maintain the MRS between consumption of the numeraire commodities and leisure. The
second effect can be viewed from (20): smaller τk result in a lower labour to capital ratio,
which increases the marginal product of labour. To restore marginal product of labour, l∗
is required to increase. With the parameters specified in Section 4.1, the second effect of τk
dominates, so l∗ increases with reduced τk in general. The simulation result shows that, in
the reform of replacing τk, the negative effect of τx outweighs the positive effect through
decreasing τk. Accordingly, l∗ decreases in τx in the reform of replacing τk, resulting in
higher level of leisure.
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The full derivatives of s∗ with respect to τx in the two tax reforms yield:
ds∗
dτx
=
∂s∗
∂τx
+
∂s∗
∂τi
dτi
dτx
, (48)
where ∂s∗∂τx > 0,
∂s∗
∂τl
> 0, and ∂s∗∂τk > 0. As shown in Table 2, increases in τx alone would pose a
positive impact on s∗ with the benchmark parameter set. To understand the effects through
the channels of decreasing income taxes, it should be noted that decreases in either income
taxes would encourage the accumulation of k as shown in (11). To maintain k˙ = 0 in
the steady state, the investment must shifts from the goods sector to the health sector
in response in both tax reforms. However, the simulation results show that the positive
effect of τx dominates. Therefore, s∗ (and thus v∗) increases with the implementations of
both reforms. However, it should be noted that the sign of ∂s∗∂τx > 0 varies with different
parameter sets, so it is possible that the reforms could have different effects on s∗ in
different scenarios.4
It should be noted that h∗ is increasing in τx in both cases. To understand the mecha-
nisms behind them, one can take the full derivations of h∗ as below:
dh∗
dτx
=
∂h∗
∂τi
∂τi
∂τx
, (49)
where ∂h∗∂τl < 0 and
∂h∗
∂τk
< 0 as shown in (38) and (39). The overall impacts of the tax reforms
on h∗ are positive. It should be noted that these increases in h∗ are not because of the
reduced detrimental effects of decreased x∗, but because of the indirect effects from the
decreased τl and τk.
The comparative-static effects on k∗ with the two types of tax reforms can be disentan-
gled into two parts as below:
dk∗
dτx
=
∂k∗
∂τx
+
∂k∗
∂τi
dτi
dτx
, (50)
4The effects of the two reforms in different scenarios can be found in Appendix C
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where ∂k∗∂τx < 0,
∂k∗
∂τl
< 0, and ∂k∗∂τk < 0. The implementation of τx should have a negative effect on
k∗ as it crowds out the resource available for the accumulation of k (as in (11)). To hold the
labour to capital ratio constant in the steady state, k∗ has to increase (decrease) as l∗(h∗)µ
increases (decreases). Therefore, the comparative-static effect on k∗ can be separated into
two parts: the effect of the variations in l∗ and the effect of the variations in h∗. In the
tax reform where τl is replaced by τx, the individual would find it optimal to raise l∗ in
response to the increased marginal labour productivity and the marginal cost of leisure
(as in (12c)). Following this increase in l∗, k∗ has to increase in order to fix the labour to
capital ratio. Consequently, the tax reform with the adjustments in τl creates positive
effect on k∗ through the channel of decreasing τl . In the reform with adjustments in τk,
the decreased τk would encourage the individual to accumulate more k. Accordingly, the
effect through the channel of decreasing τk is positive. Nevertheless, the negative effects
are overshadowed by the positive effects through the channels of decreasing income taxes
in both cases. Therefore, k∗ is increasing in τx with either reform.
With the quantitative results of the two reforms, one can then simulate the effects on
welfare in the economy by taking the quantitative results into the utility function (1). We
scale up the utility levels in order to attain positive values. The changes in welfare are
plotted in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: The changes in welfare in response to the tax reforms
In Figure 6, the solid curve represents the welfare level with the reform of replacing τl
with τx, and the dashed curve represents the welfare level with the reform of replacing
τk with τx. The tax reform where τl is replaced by τx results in decreases in both leisure
and x∗; nevertheless, due to its contribution to the increase in c∗, this tax reform still
contributes to better welfare in the long run. Figure 6 also indicates that a switch from τk
to τx would result in even better welfare in the economy. Compared to the former reform,
the replacement of τk with τx not only increase c∗ but also leisure in the long run.
5 Conclusion
This paper provides a rigorous theoretical framework to underpin existing results from
the epidemiological literature on population health: first, why taxes on unhealthy com-
modities alone might fail to improve population health, and second, why these taxes are
more likely to be beneficial to health when they are coupled with other fiscal instruments.
In addition, we also offer insights on how unhealthy commodities taxation affects the econ-
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omy and overall welfare. For this purpose, we construct a dynamic general equilibrium
two-sector model with endogenous health. The two sectors employed in the model are the
goods sector, which produces consumption commodities, and the health sector, which pro-
vides the individual with health. Health produces so-called “healthy time”, which not only
affects the level of utility by enhancing leisure time, but also allows the individual to have
more time available for work. In this model, the individual has to make trade-offs between
investments in both sectors, and the utilities from leisure, consumption of numeraire
goods, and that of unhealthy commodities. Although unhealthy commodities provide
the individual with utility, they pose detrimental effects on health. Intuitively, taxes on
unhealthy commodities should directly affect the level of health in the steady state as long
as the taxes are effective in reducing the consumption of unhealthy commodities. However,
the steady state solutions show that, even though taxes on unhealthy commodities decrease
the consumption of unhealthy commodities, the implementation of these taxes does not
directly affect the level of health in the long run. The reason is that, as the detrimental
effects decrease, the individual would find it beneficial to reduce the investment in the
health sector. Nevertheless, with revenue-neutral adjustments of taxes on labour income
or those on capital income, the implementation of taxes on unhealthy commodities can
improve the level of health through the channel of income effect. In addition, both tax
reforms contribute to higher welfare in the long run. The results offer important guidelines
to policy makers: the introduction of a tax on unhealthy commodities, for example a “sugar
tax”, should always be coupled with a reduction in other tax burdens in order to improve
the level of population health and increase overall welfare.
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Appendix A. Benchmark Parameters
Benchmark parameters
Share of capital in the good sector α 0.30
Share of capital in the health sector β 0.22
Fraction of labour supply l 0.25
Ratio of numeraire goods to output production cy 0.9773
Ratio of unhealthy commodities to output production xy 0.0227
Health expenditure as a fraction of GDP pmmy+pmm 0.12
Rate of time preference ρ 0.04
Natural depreciation of health δ 0.043
Average tax rate on capital income τk 0.28
Average tax rate on labour income τl 0.20
Average tax rate on commodities τc and τx 0.08
Appendix B. Comparative-Static Effects of the Income Taxes
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Figure 7: Comparative-static effects of τl
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Figure 8: Comparative-static effects of τk
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Figure 9: Comparative-static effects of taxes on m
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Appendix C. Tax Reforms with different Parameter Sets
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Figure 10: Tax reform with the adjustment in τl in different scenarios
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Figure 11: Tax reform with the adjustment in τk in different scenarios
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